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COMMENTS
STATE AID TO NONPUBLIC ELEMENTARY AND
SECONDARY SCHOOLS: STYMIED IN A
CONSTITUTIONAL CROSS FIRE
INTRODUCTION

Education has long held a cherished priority in the United
States, supported by the premise that an educated electorate is
necessary for a functional republic. Church related schools form
an integral part of the educational institution,1 in response to
demands for an alternative to the secular, public education provided by the states. In recent years educational institutions at
all levels have experienced increased difficulties in meeting the
costs of educating their students. Nonpublic schools are subject
to this problem of rising costs, with the additional burden of
relying on tuition and donations rather than taxes to finance their
schools.
State legislatures in the past quarter-century have attempted
to alleviate the financial burden on nonpublic schools by providing
for various types of state aid to these schools. The general purposes of such aid have been to preserve the diversity of choice in
education, with the attendant recognition that we are a pluralistic
society, and to stem the influx of nonpublic school students from
their financially plagued schools into the already crowded public
school system.
The controversy surrounding parochiaid legislation in recent
years has not centered around the purposes for such aid, but
stems from the first amendment as it applies to aid to church
related schools, which comprise the major portion of nonpublic elementary and secondary schools.2 The first amendment, made applicable to the states by the fourteenth amendment," commands that a state "shall make no law respecting
I In

1972, 5.2 million elementary and secondary school students attended

approximately 21,200 nonpublic schools, of which some 18,000 are church
related. In Illinois, nonpublic school enrollment was 451,724 students. These
statistics were taken from Justice White's dissenting opinion in Committee
For Pub. Educ. And Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973), citing
Final Report, President's Panel on Nonpublic Education, 5-6, 15-19 (1972).

2 Roman Catholic schools alone comprise 83% of the total nonpublic
school membership, enrolling 4.37 million pupils. Committee For Pub. Educ.

And Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 816 (1973).
8 Murdock v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
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an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof. ' ' 4 The United States Supreme Court decided four cases
in June of 1973,5 and the Illinois Supreme Court decided two
cases in June and October of 1973,6 on parochiaid legislation.
These six cases will serve as a focal point for the following discussion of state aid to nonpublic elementary and secondary
schools, with emphasis on their prospective effects in Illinois.
STATE AID TO NONPUBLIC PRIMARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOLS
UNDER THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

The Illinois Supreme Court in Board of Education v. Bakalis7 held that any program which is constitutional under the
federal establishment clause is constitutional under the present
wording of the Illinois constitutional provision relating to state
aid to sectarian schools. 8 Since the Illinois and Federal Constitutions are coextensive in their effects in this area of the law, a
historical review of the United States Supreme Court decisions
serves a dual function. First, a historical review will show the
gradual development of the present Supreme Court standard on
parochiaid. Second, the present standard of the Supreme Court
provides the context in which to evaluate the recent Illinois decisions and possible forms of future aid.
4 The most general expression of the controversy can be summarized
by the dicta of Justice White and of Justice Powell in two recent decisions:
Constitutional considerations aside, it would be understandable if a State
gave such parents a call on the public treasury up to the amount
it would have cost the State to educate the child in public school, or, to
put it another way, up to the amount the parents save the State by not
sending their children to public school. Committee For Pub. Educ. And
Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, [413 U.S. 756, 814 (1973) (White, J.
dissenting) ].
But if novel forms of aid have not readily been sustained by this
Court the 'fault' lies not with the doctrines which are said to create a
paradox but rather with the Establishment Clause itself: 'Congress'
and the States by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment 'shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion.' With that judgment we are
not free to tamper . . . Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825, 835 (1973).
5 Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973); Levitt v. Comm. For
Pub. Educ. And Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472 (1973); Comm. For
Pub. Educ. And Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973); Sloan
v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 (1973).
6 Board of Educ. v. Bakalis, 54 Ill. 2d 448, 299 N.E.2d 737 (1973)
People ex rel. Klinger v. Howlett, 56 Ill. 2d 1, 305 N.E.2d 129 (1973).
1 54 Ill. 2d at 461-65, 299 N.E.2d at 743-45.
8 The Illinois provision is article X, section 3 of the 1970 Illinois Constitution, accompanying the text for note 109 infra, where a more explicit
analysis of Bakalis is given. The Illinois Supreme Court in Bakalis cited
the Committee on Education's comments in retaining the wording of the
1870 Illinois Constitution, indicating that the provision as retained yields
the same results as the word "establish" in the federal first amendment, and
held that this was also the understanding of the convention and voters of
the state who adopted it. 54 Ill. 2d at 463-65, 249 N.E.2d at 744-45.
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Everson v. Board of Education," decided in 1947, was the
first Supreme Court decision to apply the establishment clause to
a state aid statute. The local school board in Everson, pursuant to
a New Jersey statute, authorized reimbursement to parents of
money expended by them for the transportation of their children
on regular busses operated by the public transportation system.
The effect of the statute was that part of the reimbursement
would be paid to parents with children in sectarian schools.', In
an opinion by Justice Black, the Court held that the statute was
constitutional, by analogizing bussing to other health, safety, and
welfare measures such as police and fire protection and sewage
disposal. The Court adopted a neutral stance toward religion, in
that bussing is separable from the religious functions of sectarian
schools, and to deny it would deny parochial students of "public
However, Justice Black emphasized that
welfare legislation.1
the first amendment erected a wall of separation between Church
and State,12 and that this statute approached the "verge" of the
state's power."2
In People ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education,1 decided
in 1948, the Court examined a released time proposal whereby
pupils from public schools, whose parents consented, could receive
religious instruction from religious teachers during regular hours
of the school day set apart for such purpose.' 5 The Court held
that the released time proposal was unconstitutional under the
first amendment.' 6 In the majority opinion, Justice Black stated
that the use of tax supported schools for religious teaching was
an aid to religion prohibited by the separation of Church and
However, in Zorach v. Clauson, decided in
State doctrine."
1952, a released time provision providing that public schools release a student during the school day for religious instruction in
religious centers, provided there was a written request from his
parents, was held constitutional. 8 Justice Douglas, writing for
the majority, distinguished the Zorach released time program
P 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
10 Id. at 2.
11 Id. at 16-18.
12 Id. at 18.

That this statute approaches the verge was reflected in the
13 Id. at 16.
5-4 decision. Justice Douglas of the majority recently has indicated he would
decide this landmark case differently, thus reversing the result in Everson
and robbing it of its precedent value in the trend to allow more permissive
forms of aid. Walz v. Tax Comm., 397 U.S. 664, 703 (1970). The dissent
of Justice Rutledge attacked the decision as a breach in the wall of separation which would lead to a corrosion of the first amendment rights as a
precedent to build on. Id. at 29.
14333 U.S. 203 (1948).
15 Id. at 205-06.
16 Id. at 210.
17Id. at 212.
Is343 U.S. 306 (1952).
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from that involved in McCollum, in that the Zorach plan involved
neither the use of public school facilities nor public funds."0
Justice Clark, in School District of Abington Township,
Pennsylvania v. Schempp, 20 decided in 1963, set down two of the
three tests later used to determine the constitutionality of legislation under the establishment clause. Justice Clark stated that
"there must be secular legislative purpose and a primary effect
21
that neither advances nor inhibits religion.1
The statute in Board of Education v. Alle'n,22 decided in
1968, required local public school authorities to lend textbooks
to students, rather than renting or selling them as was previously
done. Students attending private schools were included in the
class of students benefiting from the statute.
The statute was attacked on first amendment grounds because of its authorization of a loan of textbooks to students attending parochial schools. 23 The Court held that the statute was
constitutional 24 in a six-three decision. On behalf of the majority, Justice White applied the tests set down in Schempp, and
stated that, like Everson, the Allen statute was a law having "a
secular legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither
advances nor inhibits religion." 25 He based this conclusion on
the premise that "religious schools pursue two goals, religious
instruction and secular education," 26 and that the two processes
of secular and religious training are not intertwined. 27 . Justice
White observed that the loaning of each book had to be approved
by the public school authorities and that only secular books
would receive approval. 28 Thus, the statute would advance only
the secular goal of sectarian education and not the religious goal.
Justice White reinforced the majority position by noting that the
financial benefit generated by the statute was to the parents and
children, and that no funds or books were furnished to the parochial schools.29
0
In 1970, Walz v. Tax Commission"
added a third test to the
19 Id. at 308-09.
20374 U.S. 203
(1963).
The Schempp case centered on the issue of
Bible readings in public schools. The Court in an 8-1 decision held the readings unconstitutional.
21Id. at 222. Justice Clark cited the Everson case and McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) as his authority for the tests.
22 392 U.S. 236 (1968).

Id. at 238-39.
Id. at 238.
25 Id. at 243.
23
24
26
27
28
29

Id. at 245. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
392 U.S. 236, 248 (1968).

Id. at 244-45.
Id. at 243-44.

20 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
The Walz case held that property tax exemptions to religious organizations for properties used solely for religious

worship were constitutional.
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two outlined in Schempp. The Walz Court stated that the result
of legislation in aid of education should not be an excessive gov-

ernment entanglement with religion. Chief Justice Burger admitted that this test involved degrees of entanglement,' but
added:
[T]he questions are whether the involvement is excessive, and
whether it is a continuing one calling for official and continuing2
surveillance leading to an impermissible degree of entanglement.
In Tilton v. Richardson," Chief Justice Burger acknowledged

that the three tests developed by the court in Schempp and Walz
were not absolute and involved risks in their application. He
stated that these tests should be used "as guidelines with which

to identify instances in which the objective of the Religion
Clauses have been impaired,' '

4

and that "candor compels the

acknowledgment that we can only dimly perceive the boundaries
of permissible government activity in this sensitive area of constitutional adjudication."3 5
Shortly after Tilton, a statute providing reimbursement for

the cost of teachers' salaries, textbooks, and instructional materials in specified secular subjects and another statute providing
a salary supplement of fifteen percent to teachers in nonpublic elementary schools were at issue in Lemon v. Kurtzman" Both
31

Id. at 674.

32 Id. at 675.

33 403 U.S. 672 (1971). In his majority (5-3) opinion Chief Justice
Burger held that the Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963 providing for
nonsectarian facilities was constitutional over the contention that grants to
church related colleges and universities under the Act rendered it unconstitutional under the first amendment. Chief Justice Burger based his conclusions on the premise that there are "significant differences between the
religious aspects of church-related institutions of higher learning and parochial elementary and secondary schools." 403 U.S. at 685. This article is
confined to the discussion of the establishment clause in relation to state aid
to nonpublic elementary and secondary schools, due to this distinction.
84 Id. at 678.
85 Id.
3 403 U.S. 602 (1971). This opinion also considers Earley v. DiCenso
and Robinson v. DiCenso, joined in this appeal. In DiCenso, the Rhode
Island Salary Supplement Act of 1969 was contested. The Act recognized
that higher salaries were needed to attract competent and dedicated teachers
to nonpublic elementary schools and therefore proposed a supplement of 15%
to their current annual salary. The limitations on the supplement were:
1) the nonpublic school teacher's salary could not exceed the maximum paid
to public school teachers; 2) financial data to regulate must be furnished by
the eligible schools to the State Commissioner of Education; 3) teachers eligible for salary supplements must (a) teach only those subjects offered in the
state's public schools, (b) use only teaching materials used in the public
schools, and (c) agree in writing not to teach a course in religion while
receiving the supplement. Id. at 607-09.
In Lemon, the Pennsylvania Nonpublic Elementary and Secondary Education Act was contested. The Act recognized the crisis in nonpublic schools,
and authorized the state to "purchase" specified "secular educational services" from nonpublic schools. This involved direct state reimbursement of
nonpublic school expenditures for teachers' salaries, textbooks, and instructional materials. The limitations on the reimbursement were: 1) schools
seeking reimbursement must maintain prescribed accounting procedures,
identify secular costs, and be subject to a state audit; 2) courses benefited
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were held unconstitutional. In speaking for the majority, Chief
Justice Burger emphasized the word "respecting" in the establishment clause. A distinction between a law "establishing"
religion and one "respecting an establishment" of religion yields
a greater prohibitive effect in the latter. Chief Justice Burger
wrote:
A given law might not establish a state religion but nevertheless
be one "respecting" that end in the sense of being a step that
could lead to such establishment and hence offend the First
Amendment. 7
The Court then applied the three tests formulated in
Schempp, Allen, and Walz to the statutes at issue in Lemon. The
first test, that the statute must have a secular legislative purpose,
was met by the express legislative intent in both statutes to
"enhance the quality of the secular education in all schools covered by the compulsory attendance laws.""8 In this respect, the
Court adopted the same premise as in Allen, that "secular and
religious education are identifiable and separable. 8' 3 The second
test, that the statute in its principal or primary effect must be
one that neither advances nor inhibits religion, was not discussed
at length 4 0 since the Court used the third test of excessive government entanglement with religion to declare both statutes un41
constitutional.
The Court in Lemon found an impermissible degree of entanglement, and set the following guidelines for making such a
determination:
[W]e must examine the character and purposes of the institutions
that are benefited, the nature of the aid that the State provides, and
relationship between the government and the religious
the resulting
42
authority.
The character and purposes of parochial schools were found to
involve substantial religious activity. 4 Busses, textbooks, and
other forms of aid were acknowledged as either secular, neutral,
or nonideological 4 whereas the potential for a teacher involving
the content of a secular course with religion, in light of the religious environment of a parochial school, necessitates a much
were limited to purely secular subjects taught in public schools; 3) text-

books and other instructional materials were to be approved by the state;
and 4) a denial of reimbursement for courses containing "any subject matter
expressing religious teaching, or the morals or forms of worship of any

sect."

37

Id. at 609-11.

403 U.S. at 612.

38Id. at 613.
39

Id.

40 Id.

Id. at 614.
Id. at 615.
43 Id. at 616.

41

42

44Id.
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higher degree of discipline and control over the teacher." Thus,
a "comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing state surveillance" would be required to avoid a first amendment violation,
46
which involves excessive entanglement.
The Court also followed the distinction made in Everson
and Allen, that the state aid must be provided to the student and
his parents, and not to the sectarian school.47 Chief Justice
Burger concluded by discussing the devisive political potential
of this type of state program, warning that they led into "political fragmentation and divisiveness on religious lines . . .,,
which was "one of the principal evils against which the First
'4
Amendment was intended to protect.
9

In June of 1973, the Court decided four cases on state aid
to nonpublic schools." In Levitt v. Committee For Public Education and Religious Liberty,-' the constitutionality of a New
York law, whereby the state reimbursed nonpublic schools for
certain costs of testing and record keeping, was attacked. Both
the tests and examinations contemplated by the statute were
state prepared papers, such as "Regents' examinations" and
"Pupil Evaluation Program Tests," as well as tests prepared by
the individual teachers to measure the students' progress in subjects required to be taught under state law.' 2 The Court held the
statute unconstitutional in an eight-one decision; Chief Justice
Burger stating that the statute constituted an impermissible aid
to religion, in that the aid devoted to secular functions was "not
identifiable and separable from aid to sectarian activities."''8
The Court cited the absence of restrictions to assure that the
teacher-prepared tests would be free of religious instruction.
The danger that a teacher would "inculcate students in the re45 Id. at 617. The Court later stated:
We simply recognize that a dedicated religious person, teaching in a
school affiliated with his or her faith and operated to inculcate its tenets,
will inevitably experience great difficulty in remaining religiously neutral. Id. at 618.
46 Id. at 619.
47 Id. at 621.
48 Id. at 623.
Justice Burger envisioned a situation where religious
groups demanded more and more appropriations as their needs increased,
using a permissive decision here as precedent; and also a situation where
only a few religious groups, especially the Roman Catholics, would receive
the major portion of benefits due to their established school system, thus
creating an animosity in religious groups not so benefited.
49 Id. at 622.
50 Cases cited
note 5 supra. The first of these four cases, Norwood v.
Harrison, is not important to our present discussion. Norwood involved
state aid to private schools in Mississippi which had racially discriminatory
policies and thus was uncontitutional.
51 413 U.S. 472 (1973).
52 Id. at 475. The schools that qualified under the statute received "$27
for each pupil in average daily attendance in grades one through six and
$45 for each pupil in average daily attendance in grades seven through
twelve." Id. at 476.
53 Id. at 480.
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ligious precepts of the sponsoring church" through such tests
required stated restrictions, and their non-inclusion, probably
to avoid excessive entanglements, created a potential for conflict
which rendered the statute unconstitutional."
Three forms of state aid to nonpublic schools pursuant to a
New York statutory amendment were held unconstitutional in
Committee For Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist.55 The first section of the amendment provided for direct
money grants to "qualifying" nonpublic schools to be used for
"maintenance and repair" of facilities and equipment to ensure
the students' "health, welfare and safety." Qualifying schools
were those nonpublic elementary or secondary schools serving a
high concentration of pupils from low income families.56 The
second section established a tuition reimbursement plan for parents of children attending nonpublic elementary and secondary
schools, providing a $50 or $100 reimbursement to those parents
whose annual taxable income was less than $5,000.11
The next
three sections provided for tax relief to parents failing to qualify
for tuition reimbursement. The taxpayer-parents were entitled
to a deduction from their adjusted gross income according to the
number of their children attending nonpublic schools, and the
deduction decreased as their taxable income increased. 58
The Nyquist Court found each of these provisions to have "a
primary effect that advances religion" and offends the constitutional prohibition against laws "respecting the establishment of
religion."' 9 In so concluding, the Court applied the three tests
that had emerged from earlier decisions. The first requirement,
that the statute must reflect a "secular legislative purpose," was
met by the New York legislature in its recited goals of preserving
a healthy and safe educational environment for all its school children, relieving the overburdened public schools, and promoting
pluralism and diversity among its public and nonpublic schools.o°
The Court in Nyquist did not consider the application of the
excessive entanglements test to these provisions, but dicta in the
majority opinion by Justice Powell indicated that "assistance of
the sort here involved carries grave potential for entanglement
in the broader sense of continuing political strife over aid to
religion." 61 While political divisiveness between Church and
State and between different church groups over aid proposals
54 Id.

55 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
56 Id. at 762-63.

51Id. at 764.
58 Id. at 765-66.
59 Id. at 798.
60 Id. at 773.
"IId. at 794.
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would "not alone warrant the invalidation of state laws that
otherwise survive the careful scrutiny required by the decisions
of this Court, it is certainly a 'warning signal' not to be ig62
nored.,
The first section of the New York amendment providing
for fixed payments for maintenance and repair contained no restrictions that the sums be used only on secular portions of.the
school buildings or to pay salaries of employees working on such
exclusively secular portions. The absence of such restrictions
led to the Court's holding that the primary effect of this provision was to advance religion "in that it subsidizes directly the
religious activities of sectarian elementary and secondary
schools.' ' 63 The Court analogized this aid to that in Tilton-4 and
stated:
If the State may not erect buildings in which religious activities
are to take place, it may not maintain such buildings or renovate
them when they fall into disrepair.65
Even though this aid was limited to fifty percent of the school's
maintenance and repair budget, a mere statistical restriction on
aid does not guarantee that a portion of such aid will not be used
to finance the sectarian portion of religious education. 6
The tuition reimbursement program also failed the "effect"
test in that it provided no "effective means of guaranteeing that
the state aid derived from public funds will be used exclusively for
secular, neutral, and nonideological purposes .......
The effect
of the provision which delivered the grants to parents rather than
schools was not controlling, since this was only one factor among
many to be considered in determining the constitutionality of a
statute. The Court found that the absence of effective restrictions which would prohibit such aid from being used for sectarian purposes was the controlling factor in this case.6
Even
though this provision provided for reimbursement without coercion on the parent to use such funds for his child's education,
the "substantive impact" is the same as a subsidy to send the child
to a nonpublic school. Also, the limitation of reimbursement to
fifty percent of any parent's actual outlay was a mere statistical
assurance already found to be inadequate. Finally, the ruling of
unconstitutionality did not violate the free exercise clause, for
even though this provision would promote the free exercise of
62 Id. at 797-98.
63 Id. at 774.
64403
65

U.S. 672 (1971).

413 U.S. at 777.
66 d. at 777-78.
67 Id. at 780.
68 d. at 780-83. The Court distinguished both Everson and Allen, which
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religion, it would violate the state's mandate of "neutrality" concerning religion. 9
The final three sections providing for income tax benefits
are distinguished from the tuition grants only in that the parent
receives an actual cash payment under the tuition grant provision, while the parent is entitled to reduce his payment of tax to
the state under the tax deduction provisions.7 6 Thus, the tax
benefit provisions suffered from the same constitutional deficiencies as the tuition grant provision.71
The final statute reviewed by the Supreme Court in June of
1973 was a Pennsylvania statute providing funds to reimburse
parents for a portion of tuition expenses incurred in sending their
72
children to nonpublic schools. The Court in Sloan v. Lemon
held the statute unconstitutional in a six-three decision. The
statute was apparently passed to avoid the "excessive entanglements" ruling in Lemon v. Kurtzman,2 but the Court in Sloan
found no "constitutionally significant difference" between the
Pennsylvania statute at issue and the New York statute stricken
in Nyquist.14 The Court stated that the consequences of tuition
reimbursement were "to preserve and support religion-oriented
7
institutions." 5
Justice White, in his dissent in Lemon, had referred to the
"insoluble paradox" created by the interplay of the "primary
effect" and "excessive entanglements" tests." He noted that if
the state drafts restrictions into the legislation to ensure that
aid will not be used for a sectarian purpose, the enforcement of
such restrictions will usually be held to excessively entangle the
state with the church related schools. However, if the provision
does not provide these restrictions, there is no guarantee that the
funds will not have the primary effect of advancing religion.
Justice Powell recognized this "insoluble paradox" in Sloan,
but stated that the Court was prohibited by the first amendment's proscriptions from tampering with the clear wording of
provided direct grants to parents, in that bus rides and textbooks were

amenable to restrictions guaranteeing their secular effects.
69 Id. at 785-89.
7o Id. at 791.
71 Id. at 794. The analogy to the tax exemptions for church properties
allowed in Walz was rejected by the Court, in that church property exemptions have enjoyed a long historical acceptance to prevent oppressive taxation

of religious institutions by the state and because exemptions are granted for
educational and charitable purposes.
72 413 U.S. 825 (1973).
72403 U.S. 602 (1971).
74 413 U.S. at 828.

75 Id. at 832.
76 403 U.S. at 668.

Id. at 791-94.
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the establishment clause in reviewing the novel forms of aid
77
enacted in the states.
THEORIES

CONCERNING THE

CONSTITUTIONALITY

OF

STATE AID TO NONPUBLIC SCHOOLS

Constitutional authorities, Justices of the United States Supreme Court, and numerous litigants have espoused theories on
state aid to nonpublic schools which, in modified form, have been
reflected in the Supreme Court decisions. A brief discussion of
these theories is necessary for an understanding of the Court's
present position on the issue, and in formulating a theory of how
the Court will deal with forthcoming cases challenging aid pro78
visions.
Two theories which have been advanced adopt absolute positions in interpreting the first amendment. The first theory
adopts a literal reading of the establishment clause and holds
that the framers of the Constitution intended a strict separation.7 9 Therefore, no aid by the states to sectarian schools is
permitted. Further supporting this theory is the interpretation
that the free exercise clause prohibits aid, in that taxpayers
would be coerced to support a religion to which they do not subscribe, and that government controls on aid would eventually
restrict the free exercise of religion. The main proponents of
this theory were Justices Black"° and Rutledge,8 and presently
8 2
Justice Douglas.
The second absolute theory is at polar extremes with the
first, contending that aid is required. While by law children
must attend school, parents are free to choose a religious school,
and aid is necessary to facilitate that choice. The double burden
on the parents of nonpublic school children, to support public
schools through taxes and to pay tuition for their children attending religious schools, forces the parents to forego state assistance due to the free exercise of their religion. Justices White,
77 413 U.S. at 835.
78 An excellent analysis of these theories is given in Aid To Parochial

Schools: A Re-Examination, 14 WM. & MARY L. REv. 128 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Aid to Parochial Schools]. The classification of theories used
in that article is adopted here due to the clarity it lends to this discussion.
79 This view is supported by James Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments published in 1785, set forth in
appendices to Justice Rutledge's opinion in Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330
U.S. 1 (1947), and to that of Justice Douglas in Walz v. Tax Comm., 397
U.S. 664 (1970).
Madison was attacking a taxing measure which would
support Christian churches, whose main advocate was Patrick Henry. One
of the reasons cited in opposition to such a measure was that: "[I]t will
destroy that moderation and harmony which the forebearance of our laws
to intermeddle with Religion has produced amongst its several sects."
8o See Everson v. B. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 41 (1947) ; and People ex rel.
McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
"' See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
82 See Douglas' dissent in McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
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Burger, and Rehnquist have advanced views similar to this
absolute position."
Other theories have adopted positions in the continuum
between these two absolutes.
The child benefit theory argues that permissibility of aid
should hinge on the identity of the recipient. If the child is
directly benefited, the fact that the school is incidentally bene84
fited is of no consequence.
The neutrality theories merge the establishment and free
exercise clauses to attain a single principle. Under one neutrality theory, espoused by Professor Philip Kurland,8 5 there
should be perfect equality between religious and nonreligious
sectors. This theory would allow state funds for religious schools
if the legislative classification was broad enough to include like
organizations in the public sector. Thus, the state would not use
religion as a standard for action or inaction, since the neutrality
of the first amendment clauses prohibits classification in terms of
religion. A second neutrality theory, advanced by Professors
Paul Freund and Donald Giannella, is based on the values the
first amendment was designed to protect. 6 These values are voluntarism, mutual abstention, and neutrality. "Voluntarism" is
a policy that religion "must not be coerced or dominated by the
state, and individuals must not be coerced into or away from the
exercise or support of religion.""7 "Mutual abstention" demands
that politics be kept out of religion and religion out of politics.
"Neutrality" refers to "government neutrality among religions
and between religion and non-religion." 88
Under the "no imposition" theory, not all aid to religious
schools is prohibited, but only that aid which imposes or induces
religious belief.8 9 Aid which facilitates free exercise without
imposition is permissible," and if it indirectly or directly fur83
See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); Committee For Pub.
Educ. And Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
84330 U.S. 1 (1947).
85 Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. CHI. L.

REV. 1 (1961).

86 Freund, Public Aid to Parochial Schools, 82 HARy. L. REv. 1680
(1969) [hereinafter cited as FREUND]; Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment and Doctrinal Development Part II. The Nonestablishment
Principal, 81 iHAv. L. REV. 513 (1968) ; Giannella, Religious Liberty, N ones-

tablishment, and Doctrinal Development Part I.
The Religious Liberty
Guarantee, 80 HARv. L. REv. 1381 (1967).
This was also supported by

Justice Clark in Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222
(1963). The "secular purpose" and "primary effects' tests are a reflection
of this principle.
87 FREUND, note 86 supra, at 1684.
88 Id. at 1686.

89 Schwarz,
The Nonestablishment Principle: A Reply To Professor
Giannella, 81 HARv. L. REV. 1465 (1968).
90 Schwarz, No Imposition of Religion: The Establishment Clause Value,

77 YALE L.J. 692, 730 (1968).
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thers religion, a balancing test 9' is employed which considers such
factors as whether it advances proselytism of religion,9 2 the convertibility of funds from nonproselytising functions to prohibited
functions, and whether such aid is substantial.9
The "quid pro quo" theory allows direct or indirect 'state aid
to nonpublic sectarian schools up to the value of the secular educational service tendered by the school.14 These funds may be
spent on any service in the school including those for religious
purposes, as long as the aid did not exceed the value of the
secular services in that school. The state, it is reasoned, would
be repaying nonpublic schools for services which the state would
have been obligated to provide, and thus would be a quid pro
quo purchase of services.
The balancing technique, though not a theory, is the approach used by the courts in Ever son and several religion cases
not involving aid.9 ' As each case is decided, the public benefit
of the provision is balanced against the aid to religion through
an examination of such factors as the purpose of the aid, the
amount of the fund, and the selection of recipients. 6 This technique leaves the courts broad leeway in deciding each case on its
own circumstances, but lends itself to confusion and unpredictability in forecasting
whether particular aid provisions are con7

stitutional .1

The Three-part Test and Its Effects on
Theories and Legislation
As discussed earlier in this comment, the Supreme Court
has developed a standard, three-part test which, in effect, contradicts most of the theories concerning the constitutionality of
state aid to nonpublic schools. The standard is that the law in
question must: 1) reflect a clearly secular legislative purpose;
2) have a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion; 3) avoid excessive government entanglement with religion.9 8
The first test requiring a "clearly secular legislative purpose" has not been used by the Court to strike down aid legislation. Its only purpose, in effect, is to require a recital
in the aid provisions of health, safety and welfare goals, a
Id. at 731-32.
Id. at 734.
Id. at 735.
94 Choper, The Establishment Clause and Aid to Parochial Schools, 56
CAi. L. Rev. 260, 265-66 (1968) [hereinafter cited as CHOPERL].
95 Everson v. Ed. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947); McGowan v. Maryland
366 U.S. 420 (1961) ; Zorach v. Clawson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
91

92

93

96

CHOPER,

note 94 supra, at 324.

91 Aid to Parochial Schools, note 78 supra, at 146.
98 Committee For Pub. Educ. And Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S.
756, 773 (1973).
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desire for diversity, or other secular goals. The Court, in examining such recitals, seems to take judicial notice of the fact
that each state has a valid interest in "promoting pluralism and
diversity," and in relieving an "overburdened public school
'
system."99
The second and third tests together lend a broad prohibitive
effect to the standard whereby aid proposals are measured. The
Court has recognized that religious schools pursue two goals in
education and that the religious and secular goals may be separable."° ° To ensure that the funds from aid proposals are used
only for the secular sector, legislatures mustbe wary of too many
restrictions which might lead to excessive entanglement.10° Too
few restrictions, however, do not sufficiently guarantee that the
aid will be used to advance only the secular functions. 0 2 Therefore, under the three-part standard, only the limited forms of aid
which require minimal restriction to guarantee their secular
effect will be upheld in the future.
The Supreme Court, in June of 1973 and in the Lemon case,
dashed the rationale of the previously discussed theories concerning the constitutionality of state aid to nonpublic schools
on the rocks of this three-part standard. "Child benefit" was
rejected as a controlling factor in Nyquist.' ° 3 The "quid pro
quo" theory loses its effectiveness when reimbursement or direct
grants for services are entangled in restrictions to ensure their
secular effect.'0 4 The "no imposition" theory has been incorporated into the second test requiring that the primary effect of
the aid neither advance nor inhibit religion. However, the third
test of "excessive entanglements" strips this theory to a mere
support for the "primary effects" test. The "neutrality" theory
of Professor Kurland has never been accepted by the Court,105
and Professors Freund and Giannella's theories of neutrality have
been severely qualified by the "excessive entanglements" test. 0 6
99 Id. at 773.
100 403 U.S. at 613.

A theory supporting state aid to the secular functions of parochial schools based on this premise of separability of functions
is advanced in Valente & Stanmeyer, Public Aid to Parochial Schools - A
Reply To Professor Freund, 59 Gro. L.J. 59 (1970).
101 Cases cited at note 5 supra.

403 U.S. 602 (1971).
413 U.S. at 781-83.
See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). A statistical limitation
on aid would not involve excessive entanglement in its built in restriction
102
103
104

on funds.

However, the Court in Lemon and Nyquist held that such a

restriction was not a sufficient guarantee of the secular effect of the aid.

Therefore, a loophole in the cross fire of the "primary effects" and "excessive entanglements" tests was quickly closed.

Aid to ParochialSchools, note 78 supra, at 140.
The Court in Nyquist recognized that the first amendment "compels
the State to pursue a course of 'neutrality' toward religion." 413 U.S. at
792-93. Yet, even if an aid proposal exhibits such a neutrality, it may be
defeated by the "excessive entanglements" test. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
105
106
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The "balancing technique" is still viable in areas of legislation
other than state aid to nonpublic schools. But in reviewing the
aid proposals, the Court gives only lip service to such factors
as who the recipient of the aid will be,117 and seems to apply the
three-part test as a rigid standard to strike down most aid provisions.
The effects of the three-part test and its application have
moved the Court closer to the absolute prohibition of aid. The
second and third tests in concert may be interpreted to invalidate
almost every substantial aid proposal. The constitutional philosophers favoring an absolute construction of the Bill of Rights
in general and the first amendment in particular may well be
pleased that in substance, if not in form, their philosophy is being
forwarded. The emergence of the three-part test on a case by
case, ad hoc basis, has been and will continue to be criticized
by those wishing for more "play in the joints" in state aid
proposals. 08°
THE ILLINOIS DECISIONS ON STATE AID TO
NONPUBLIC PRIMARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOLS

The 1970 Illinois Constitution contains a specific section
entitled "Public Funds For Sectarian Purposes Forbidden."
Article X, section 3, adopted verbatim from the 1870 Illinois
Constitution' 0 9 states:
Neither the General Assembly nor any county, city, town,
107 413 U.S. at 781-82.
Paul G. Haskell submitted his views in The Prospects for
Public Aid to ParochialSchools, 56 MINN. L. REV. 159 (1971) as follows:
It is the writer's view that in making a judgment of constitutionality
under the establishment clause, the Court should not direct its inquiry
to the expressed purposes for which the funds are to be employed, but
should look more broadly at the social function performed by the parochial schools. There can be no doubt that parochial schools were created
so that the religious and philosophical positions of the church would be
an integral part of the instruction. But it is submitted that the principal or primary social function or achievement or effect of the parochial
school is the furnishing of education comparable to the education furnished by the public school system.
Id. at 184.
Prof. Haskell also stated:
If sufficient funds are available to maintain some of these private schools,
then a judgment has to be made as to whether the preservation of the
principle [no aid to parochial schools] is worth the loss of the educational
value. The writer's bias is that the principle is not worth the loss, and
that the loss of any portion of the limited diversity that presently exists
would be most unfortunate.
Id. at 160.
It is this writer's opinion that the principle of separation between Church
and State should not be compromised by the circumstances of our times.
Although the separation doctrine may be interpreted in many ways, it is
submitted that the limited aid provisions of today, if held constitutional,
would lend themselves as precedents to more extensive aid provisions in the
future. This would lead to an extensive involvement of Church and State,
and thus the principle of separation should not be lightly discarded for the
exigencies of the moment.
LO9ILL. CONST. art. VIII, § 3 (1870).
108 Prof.

Thc John lMarshall Journal of Practice and Procedure

280

[Vol. 7:265

township, school district, or other public corporation, shall ever
make any appropriation or pay from any public fund whatever,
anything in aid of any church or sectarian purpose, or to help
support or sustain any school, academy, seminary, college, university, or other literary or scientific institution, controlled by any
church or sectarian denomination whatever; nor shall any grant or
donation of land, money, or other personal property ever be made
public corporation, to any church, or for
by the State, or any such
110
any sectarian purpose.
Until November of 1972, only a few older cases had been
decided on the application of section 3. The Illinois Supreme
Court in 1888 held that tuition payments paid by the county,
for dependent children who were committed by judicial order to
an industrial school controlled by the Roman Catholic Church,
violated section 3."'1 The court rejected an argument that such
payments were in return for tuition and clothing, and thus not
"in aid" of a sectarian purpose."'
In 1917, the issue was again presented to the Illinois Supreme Court."' The Cook County Board had appropriated funds
for the care and maintenance of the girls committed by the juvenile court to the industrial school."" The court held that such
payments were constitutional in that they were not an "aid to

the Catholic church or its sectarian purposes.

.

.

.,1115

Two

grounds were advanced for this conclusion. First, the "letter
and spirit of the Constitution" would not prevent the children of
members of a church from receiving the religious instruction
they would have received at home, if the state had not assumed
their control. Second, the payments received by the school were
less than the actual cost for each girl in a similar institution
maintained by the state."
This second point had been proved
by the evidence in the case, and thus could be distinguished
1
from the earlier case. '7
This decision was subsequently followed under very
factual situations."" Each later case was decided on the
that the payments from the state were less or equal to
stitution's value to the state. Thus, the payments were

similar
ground
the intreated

110 ILL. CONST. art. X, § 3 (1970).
"' County of Cook v. Chicago Industrial School for Girls, 125 Ill. 540,
18 N.E. 183 (1888).
12 Id. at 570-71, 18 N.E. at 197-98.
113 Dunn v. Chicago Industrial School for Girls, 280 Ill. 613, 117 N.E.
735 (1917).
114 Id. at 614, 117 N.E. at 735.
15 Id. at 619, 117 N.E. at 737.
116 Id. at 618-19,117 N.E. at 737.
"1

Id.

s Dunn v. Addison Manual Training School for Boys, 281 Ill. 352, 117
N.E. 993 (1917) ; Trost v. Ketteler Manual Training School for Boys, 282
"

Ill. 504, 118 N.E. 743 (1918); St. Hedwig's Industrial School for Girls v.
County of Cook, 289 Ill. 432, 124 N.E. 629 (1919).
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as a purchase of services rather than as aid to the institutions. 119
This theory, it may be noted, is identical to the "quid pro quo"

theory of aid, which has been rejected by the United States Supreme Court in its recent decisions.2°
For over a half-century there were no reported Illinois

cases on state aid to nonpublic schools. However, in an opinion
filed June 25, 1973, the Illinois Supreme Court upheld a statute
providing transportation to children attending nonpublic schools
in Board of Education v. Bakalis.12 The statute in issue stated

that a school board which provides transportation to public school
students must also provide transportation to nonpublic school

students on the same regular routes. 22 Pursuant to this statute,
the plaintiff school board was requested to furnish transportation

for more than seventy-six pupils enrolled in religious schools in
that district. The school board stated that this would result in
substantial additional cost, 1 23 and sought a declaratory judgment
that the statute was unconstitutional under both the Federal and
Illinois Constitutions, as well as the issuance of a writ of injunction, enjoining the defendants from withholding funds because of
the plaintiff's refusal to furnish transportation to nonpublic
2 4
school pupils.

The school board argued that this transportation provision
constituted assistance to church controlled schools and thus, an
aid to the church which controlled that school, despite the benefits
under the statute being received by the child. 2 5 The Illinois
Supreme Court, citing the Everson case extensively, 26 the
Walz12 and Lemon decisions, 28 and various state appellate and

supreme court decisions on bussing," 9 held that:
[This provision] was enacted for the secular legislative purpose
of protecting the health and safety of children traveling to and from
119 282
120 See

Ill. at 510, 118 N.E. at 745-46.
Lemon v. Kurtzman 403 U.S. 602 (1971); Committee For Pub.
Educ. And Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
121 54 Ill. 2d 448, 299 N.E.2d 737 (1973).
122 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122,
29-4 (1973) provides as follows:
The school board of any school district that provides any school bus or
conveyance for transporting pupils to and from the public schools shall
afford transportation, without cost, for children who attend any school
other than a public school, who reside at least 1 miles from the school
attended, and who reside on or along the highway constituting the regular route of such public school bus or conveyance, such transportation
to extend from the homes of such children or from some point on the
regular route nearest or most easily accessible to their homes to and
from the school attended, or to or from a point on such regular route
which is nearest or most easily accessible to the school attended by
such children.
12354 Ill. 2d at 452, 299 N.E. 2d at 739.
124id. at 451-52, 299 N.E.2d at 738-39.
125 Id. at 461, 299 N.E.2d at 743.
126 Id. at 453-59, 299 N.E.2d at 739-42.
127 Id. at 457-58, 299 N.E.2d at 741-42.
128 Id. at 458, 299 N.E.2d at 742.
1291
Id. at 459-60, 299 N.E.2d at 742-43.
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schools; that the primary effect of the statute neither
nor inhibits religion, that any benefit to the parochial
church controlling it is incidental and that the statute
foster an excessive government entanglement with re-

The school board contended that the Illinois Constitution

was more restrictive than the first amendment, and prohibited

"even incidental aid or benefits to sectarian schools."' 13 1 The court
in Bakalis looked not only at voter understanding of the provision when they adopted it, but also at the constitutional convention's intent as witnessed by their-debates preceding the retention of the 1870 wording.,3 2 The Education Committee, in retaining the language, cited legal authorities who "indicated that
the present language is no more restrictive than the Federal
language but rather yields the same substantive results. ' 13 3 Thus,

the committee concluded "that any program which is constitutional under the Federal 'establishment' clause is constitutional
under the present wording of Article VIII, Section 3.'134 The

court held that since this was the understanding of the provision by the committee, the convention, and the voters, it did
35
not violate the Illinois Constitution.1

The court also held that the validity of the provision under
the three-part test placed it "outside the prohibition of section 3
of article I against any preference being given by law to any
religious denomination."136 The transportation of school children, whether public or nonpublic, served a public purpose and
thus did not contravene the 1970 Constitution, Article VIII,

section 1 (a) which provides: "Public funds, property or credit
shall be used only for public purposes.' ' 7 Justice Ryan, in a
special concurrence, agreed with the decision of the majority,
but expressed the opinion that section 3 of Article X of the 1970
1-30 Id. at 461, 299 N.E.2d at 743.
The court recognized the difficulty of
distinguishing funds for the public's welfare and funds which aid or sustain
religious institutions. Id. at 457, 299 N.E.2d at 741. However, the court
stated, after their study of the cases, that:
[T]he majority view and the trend of judicial opinion is that transportation at public expense of parochial school students on the same basis
as public school students is considered primarily a health-and-safety
measure for the benefit of all students, and that any aid to the parochial
school, or the church supporting it, is incidental.
Id. at 460, 299 N.E.2d at 743.
131 Id. at 461, 299 N.E.2d at 743.
132 Id. at 461-64, 299 N.E.2d at 743-45, citing People ex rel. Keenan v.
McGuane, 13 Ill.
2d 520, 527, 150 N.E.2d 168, 172 (1958).
133 Id. at 463-64, 299 N.E.2d at 745.
134 Id.

135Id. at 464-65, 299 N.E.2d at 745.

13,6Id. at 466, 299 N.E.2d at 746. This refuted the plaintiff's contention
that providing for free transportation granted a preference to the Catholic
Church who controls 88% of the elementary and 95% of the secondary
school children attending nonpublic schools in Illinois. Id. at 465, 299 N.E.2d
at 745-46.
137 Id. at 466, 299 N.E.2d at 746.
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Constitution was more restrictive than the first amendment. 138
On July 1, 1972, the Governor of Illinois signed into law
1
three enactments providing aid to nonpublic schools."9
The first
act provided for state reimbursement of a portion of the costs
of educating nonpublic elementary and secondary school children
to families whose total income was less than $3,000 per year.
The grants were limited to the actual per-pupil amount contributed by the state to the public school district in which the nonpublic school child resided. The second act provided for the furnishing
at state cost of secular textbooks and services to children in nonpublic elementary and secondary schools. The books and services
were to be the same as those provided for public school children
in the state. They were also to be limited in amount to the actual
per-pupil amount of aid contributed by the state to the public
school district in which the nonpublic school child resides. The
third act authorized creation of a board to make state grants to
finance exemplary and innovative elementary and secondary
school programs of a secular nature. The programs were to be
conducted by public or combined public and nonpublic personnel.140
The supreme court denied leave to file an original action of
mandamus to compel the Auditor of Illinois to implement these
programs. The court suggested that the action be brought in
the circuit court in an adversary proceeding.'
The circuit court
held that the Parental Grant Act and the Development Board Act
were constitutional under the three-part test, but that the Low
Income Family Act was unconstitutional under Lemon as having
a "primary effect that advances religion. '' 142 Both parties appealed to the Illinois Supreme Court, which awaited the United
States Supreme Court's decisions of June 25, 1973. The Illinois
138Id. at 472-78, 299 N.E.2d at 752.
139 Nonpublic State Parental Grant Plan for Children of Low Income

Families Act, P.A. 77-1890, [1972] Ill. Laws 1st & 2nd Spec. Sess. 246;
Nonpublic State Parental Grant Act, P.A. 77-1891, [1972] Ill. Laws 1st &
2nd Spec. Sess. 252; Illinois Educational Development Board Act, P.A.
77-1895, [1972] Ill.Laws 1st & 2nd Spec. Sess. 260.
140 Innovative programs such as remedial instruction, school health, psychological and vocational guidance and counseling, specialized instruction, and
others were contemplated by this Act. ILL. REV.STAT. ch. 122, T 1059 (1973).
141Under 1970 ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 4(4), the supreme court may exercise original jurisdiction in mandamus cases. The court denied leave to
file as a matter of procedure:
It appears to the Court, based in part upon our earlier consideration of
similar legislation, that the degree of 'entanglement' of church and State
involved in the implementation of the questioned statutes can best be

assessed on the basis of a record of testimony or other evidence presented initially in an adversary action in a trial court, and thereafter
expeditiously reviewed pursuant to the provisions of Rule 302 (b).
Order, Illinois Supreme Court, July 6, 1972.
142Memorandum Opinion and Judgment Order of the Circuit Court of
Cook County, People of the State of Illinois ex rel. Klinger v. Howlett, No.
72 L 8703 (1972).

284

The John Marshall Journal of Practice and Procedure

[Vol. 7:265

Supreme Court, in People ex rel. Klinger v. Howlett, thereafter
decided all three acts were unconstitutional in a five-two de4
cision.' 3
The court restated the three-part test as the standard by
which these statutes were to be measured.14 4 The court affirmed
the unconstitutionality of the grant plan for low income families. 145 The legislative purposes were found to be "unexceptional"; however, the program could not be distinguished from
that ruled unconstitutional in Nyquist. The court found that
the "effect of the aid is unmistakably to provide desired financial
and thus its prisupport for nonpublic, sectarian institutions,"
4
mary effect was to advance religion.
The second act, concerning the furnishing of textbooks and
"auxiliary services" to nonpublic school students, was also found
unconstitutional. 47 The Illinois Supreme Court considered textbooks and auxiliary services separately. The act provided that
parents of nonpublic school children should request textbooks
from a list maintained by the state. The school district would
either loan or rent the textbooks to the nonpublic school students,48
depending on the arrangement with the public school students.1
The court announced two reasons for invalidating this arrangement. Textbooks for public school children are paid for by the
taxpayers of the local school district, whereas under this act the
cost of textbooks for nonpublic school students is paid for by the
state. "[T]he result is to create a State subsidy for textbooks
furnished to children who attend nonpublic schools which is not
available for textbooks furnished to students who attend public
schools."'1 4 9 The court cited dicta in Sloan which indicated that
programs supplying bus transportation and secular textbooks
must aid "all parents," whereas this act aided only nonpublic
school students.1 50 The second reason for invalidating the textbook provision was based on the theory expressed in the act that
the nonpublic school child was "entitled" to such payment as a
matter of "right and duty." The court denied the existence under
14356

Ill.
2d 1, 305 N.E.2d 129 (1973).

Justice Schaeffer wrote the

majority opinion, with Justices Kluczynski and Ward dissenting.

Id. at 4, 305 N.E.2d at 130.
145 Id. at 6-7, 305 N.E.2d at 132.
144

146 Id. at 6, 305 N.E.2d at 132.

147 Id. at 11-12, 305 N.E.2d at 134.
148 Id. at 8, 305 N.E.2d at 132-33. For example, in Cook County, textbooks, workbooks, and all nontextual instructional materials except 16-mm.
films are furnished to all students on a free - loan basis through the Bureau
of Instruction Materials. THE LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS, THE KEY To OUR
LocAL GOVERNMENT 76 (3d ed. 1972). Thus, in Cook County textbooks would
have been loaned to nonpublic school students. Chicago levies a tax to support this free - loan arrangement. However, many other districts provide
textbooks on a rental basis.
149 56 Ill. 2d at 8-9, 305 N.E.2d at 133.
150 Id. at 9, 305 N.E.2d at 133.
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the first amendment of such a "duty."' 51
The statute respecting auxiliary services was similar to the
textbook provisions. However, it was distinguished in two ways:
first, the grants were paid directly to the school district; second,
the school district was reimbursed by the state only for services
rendered to nonpublic school students, but not those rendered
to public school students. 5 2 The court found that the health
services contemplated were "either purely secular or they can be
determined to be secular without such policing as would amount
to 'excessive entanglement.' "153 However, the school guidance
and counseling services, psychological services, and remedial and
therapeutic programs for educationally disadvantaged children
were found to be "not susceptible of supervision to assure a
strictly secular content." The potential for conflict "inheres in
the situation," and since the state failed to impose restrictions
guaranteeing their secular content, this constituted an impermissible aid to religion. The secular and sectarian functions of
such services were not identifiable and separable.5 4 The court
also held that the auxiliary services program suffered from the
same infirmity as the textbook provision, in that its finance was
not alike for both public and nonpublic students.1 55
The purpose of the board created by the third act was to
establish "exemplary and innovative" programs in elementary
and secondary schools by providing grants. 56 At the date of
decision by the court, the board had not been appointed and no
grants had been made. In the absence of express policies, the
court warned that the fiscal control of the public school district
could lead to excessive entanglements of government with church
schools. If no such supervision was created, there would be no
assurance "that the state-supported activity is not being used for
religious indoctrination.' 1 57 Neither contingency might occur,
but in the absence of implementation, the court held that the
158
third act was also unconstitutional.
151 Id. at 9-10, 305 N.E.2d at 133.

152 Id. at 10, 305 N.E.2d at 134.
1 Id.
154 Id. at 11-12, 305 N.E.2d at 134.
155 Id. at 11, 305 N.E.2d at 134.
156 Id. at 12-13, 305 N.E.2d at 134-35.
157 Id. at 14, 305 N.E.2d at 136, citing Levitt.
158Id. at 14, 305 N.E.2d at 136.
Justice Kluczynski, in his dissent,
agrees with the holding of unconstitutionality of the first act. However,
he would hold the second and third acts constitutional. He compares the
textbook provision favorably with that approved in Allen. The distinction
by the majority is rejected since Justice Kluczynski felt that each taxpayer
would be treated equally within his classification, and that the majority's argument, if valid, would only be under fourteenth amendment "equal protection" grounds. He viewed the auxiliary services as valid health, safety, and
welfare measures. Finally, he would uphold the third act despite the absence
of implementation, by according it a presumption of validity. Id. at 14-21,
305 N.E.2d at 136-39.
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CONCLUSION AND LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS

The Illinois Supreme Court invalidated the textbook grant in
Klinger on a ground novel to parochiaid litigation. The court
added a restriction to the already imposing three-part test: state
aid must include both nonpublic and public school children in
the same classification when disbursing state funds. Thus, while
the state may enact legislation which benefits the public schools
only, a proposal intended to benefit nonpublic school children
must also include children in public schools.
The Court cited both the statute in Allen and the dicta in
Sloan as its basis for determining that the textbook provision was
unconstitutional in Klinger and for imposing the additional restriction on the three-part test. The statute upheld in Allen
required local public school authorities to lend textbooks to all
students, and included both public and nonpublic school students
in the same category. 19 Dicta in the Sloan decision attacked
the tax reimbursement scheme for having "singled out a class of
its citizens for a special economic benefit,"' 160 and distinguished it
from programs benefiting all children or parents. 6 '
However, the United States Supreme Court in Allen and
Sloan never addressed itself to the classification issue which concerned the Illinois Supreme Court. The Court in Allen had upheld
the New York textbook provision under the three-part test and
had held that the statute would advance only the secular goal of
sectarian education. 6 2 The Sloan case had involved a statute
providing for tax reimbursement to parents of nonpublic school
children,163 an aid far different in its effect and amenability to
government control than textbook provisions. Therefore, the
non-inclusion of public school students in the Klinger provisions
should have been decided on fourteenth amendment grounds. The
court's determination would then have been based on whether
the classification excluding public school students had some rational basis, to avoid the contention of a denial of "equal protec164
tion of the laws.'
Since Klinger is now the law in Illinois, state legislators and
special interest groups must rely on a four-part standard to determine the constitutionality of state aid to public schools. First,
the purpose of such aid must be secular, and neither advance nor
inhibit religion. If the aid is classified as a health, safety, and
welfare measure, the state may include language describing such
aid as a duty of the state to the child, or a right of the child to
159 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
160 413 U.S. at 832.
161 Id.
102

392 U.S. 236 (1968).

163413 U.S. 825 (1973).
164 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.

19741

-

State Aid to Nonpublic Schools

such aid. However, if the aid falls out of this category, a recital
of "duty," "right," "entitlement," or words to that effect may
be fatally defective to the legislation.
Second, the primary effect of the aid must be secular, and
neither advance nor inhibit religion. Realizing that religious
schools serve a dual function, sufficient restrictions in the legislation are necessary to guarantee that the aid is used only for the
secular function.
Third, the legislation or the possible implementation thereof
must not involve excessive government entanglement with the
Church. Express policies governing the fiscal control over the
aid provision must be enacted to provide a basis from which the
court may determine the degree of entanglement involved. The
aid must be sufficiently neutral to satisfy the second test and yet
require minimal restrictions to satisfy the third test.
Fourth, state legislation providing state funds for nonpublic
school students must pre-empt the local school district's funding
of the public school students in that specific area of legislation,
and then provide state funds for both the nonpublic and public
students alike. Or, the state may earmark funds already being
provided to local districts by the state for the financing of categorical aid for both public and nonpublic school students in that
area. This option seems unlikely in view of the increasing pressure on local districts to meet the financial demands of educating
public school students. It would only controvert the expressed
legislative purpose of relieving the already overburdened public
school systems, and could be expected to meet with heavy legislative opposition.
Either of these options would overcome the objections regarding the financing of textbooks and health services asserted
in Klinger. The first option could greatly increase the state's
role in financing local schools. Presently, Illinois public schools
are receiving over fifty percent of their funding from local taxpayers. 165 The percentages of local, state, and federal funding
could be readjusted in the future to provide even more state
funding to accommodate programs for nonpublic school children.
However, increasing state funding would coincide with increasing
state control of local school districts and their administrative and
policy decisions. Diminishing local autonomy and control over
education could produce undesirable results which might not
165 The Illinois percentages in 1968-69 were 68.1% local, 26.7% state,

and 5.2% federal funding. (Figures taken from THIE LEAGUE OF WOMEN
VOTERS, THE KEY To OUR LocAL GOVERNMENT 73 (3d ed. 1972). The state's
percentage of funding since then has been increased. In the Chicago area,
the local taxpayers provide 53.8%, the state 35.7% and the federal government 10.5% of the funding. (Taken from "The 1974 School Board of Education's Annual Budget for the City of Chicago.")
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justify the desirable features of a shift in financing.
Further, a constitutional controversy has been raging in the
past few years over the system of school financing based on local
property taxes, which results in an unequal tax dollar behind
children in wealthy, as compared to poor, school districts.' 6 The
theory underlying the attack against the traditional system of
school finance based on ad valorem property taxes is that children
from poorer school districts are denied equal protection of the
law due to unequal funding.'6
This argument was recently
rejected by the United States Supreme Court.0 8 Consequently,
the states are now being asked to supply a greater percentage of
educational financing as a matter of policy, rather than as a
16
constitutional right.
A legislative collision between advocates of state aid to nonpublic schools and proponents of increased public education funding by the state would therefore appear imminent. Any substantial effort at funding nonpublic school students' textbooks or
other forms of aid would compete for additional tax dollars with
those interests lobbying for increased state funding to break
down inequities in funding behind students. In reality, however,
many legislators who represent districts with a poor population
have strong religious support in their district as well and in
many instances these groups are the same. Due to the financial
requirement in Klinger, supporters of state aid to nonpublic
schools will certainly welcome increased state funding of public
schools and the concerns of both interest groups may ultimately
16

See Kamin, The School Finance Language of the Education Article:

The Chimerical Mandate, 6 JOHN MAR. J. PRAC. & PROC. 331 (1973);
Richards, Equal Opportunity and School Financing:Towards a Moral Theory
of Constitutional Adjudication, 41 U. CHI. L. REv. 32 (1973); Keenan,
Current Issues in Illinois School Law: The Consumer's Perspective, 23
DEPAUL L. REV. 402 at 457-61 (1973).
167 See Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584 487 P.2d 1241 (1971).
168 San Antonio Independent School bist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1
(1973). This decision was criticized in Richards, Equal Opportunity and
School Financing: Towards a Moral Theory of ConstitutionalAdjudication,
41 U. CHI. L. REv. 32 (1973). Richards adopted Professor Ronald Dworkin's
maxim that there should be a fusion of constitutional law and moral theory.
The moral ideal of equal opportunity would then require the "strict scrutiny"
of any legislative scheme for review on equal opportunity grounds. Thus,
he would uphold the "strict scrutiny" in Serrano and reverse the "weak"
standard in Rodriguez. Equal Protection would also require a strict scrutiny
of state aid to nonpublic schools, and require "an expansive reading of
constitutional inhibitions against such aid and provide a reason to resist
political moves in that direction." Id. at 71.
169 In Illinois, proponents of increased state funding of education sued
the state seeking to require it to provide not less than 50% of the funding
for elementary and secondary public schools. The basis of their contention
was the wording in the 1970 Illinois Constitution that "The State has the
primary responsibility for financing the system of public education." The
court rejected this contention and held that the language was merely hortatory and only expressed a goal to be strived for. Blase v. State, 55 Ill. 2d
94, 302 N.E.2d 46 (1973). Thus, a possible state constitutional mandate
was also denied to Illinois.
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be aligned to pass legislation favorable to each.
Suggestions for future legislative proposals for state aid to
nonpublic schools in Illinois must be made with two factors in
mind. First, consideration must be given to federal aid provisions now in effect which have been viable in providing certain
programs to nonpublic schools in Illinois. Second, the legislative
proposal must meet the three-part test set up by the United
States Supreme Court and the financing requirement in Illinois.
Areas in which federal aid provisions have been effective in
supplying the needs of both public and nonpublic schools must be
examined before legislative proposals are made, in order to determine whether they are sufficiently satisfying the need for aid
in those areas, or whether a state supplement to the federal
programs in those areas would be desirable. Federal programs by
which nonpublic schools now enjoy benefits include the national
school lunch program, 170 special milk programs,' 17 1 loans for scientific and language equipment,'172 and many of the title pro-

grams deriving from the Elementary and Secondary Education
Act of 1965.17 The title programs have been beneficial to nonpublic schools by providing for reading programs for educationally
deprived children in disadvantaged areas,'7 4 health services,' 7 5 li-

brary resources and library textbooks, 176 supplementary educa178
It must
tion centers and services, 17 and bilingual education.
be emphasized that the title programs are provided to both public
National School Lunch Act, 42 U.S.C. 1751 et seq. (1946).
Agricultural Act of 1954, 7 U.S.C. 1446(c) (1954).
172 National Defense Education Act of 1958, 20 U.S.C. 445 (1958).
1'7 This Act has been incorporated throughout Title 20 of the United
States Code.
174 Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, 20 U.S.C. 241(a)
et seq. (1965). These are the federal Title I programs. Illinois receives
approximately 66 million dollars of this aid, with the Chicago area receiving
approximately 40 million of that portion. The Chicago nonpublic schools
receive most of their federal assistance in the title programs from the Title
I provisions. Forty schools in the Cook and Lake County areas are entitled
to this aid and are participating in these programs. The two criteria for a
district to qualify for Title I assistance are: 1) the geographical area must
be a low income area, and 2) the child must be educationally deprived at
least one or two years behind in his educational skills. Remedial reading
programs are the top priority, although fairly comprehensive health services are also provided. During the last year, these programs have been
shifting from merely public school programs in which all students who qualify
may participate, to programs provided in public and nonpublic schools alike.
175 Id.
176 Id. §§ 821 et seq. These are the Title II programs, and they presently
provide $1.25 per student per year for the purchase of such materials.
1771Id.
H§841 et seq. These are the Title III programs which contemplate
projects such as guidance and counseling, remedial instruction, physical education, special instruction, and equipment for advanced scientific subjects.
Eight million dollars is presently being expended in Illinois on these programs, although the public schools are not providing the innovative programs
necessary to attract the nonpublic schools.
178 Bilingual Education Act, 20 U.S.C. 880b et seq. (1968).
Most of the
assistance here is from the state, although the federal Title VII program provides for such assistance.
170

171
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and nonpublic schools, and thus do not suffer from the infirmity
of an exclusive legislative classification found in the Klinger
decision.17 Although control of the more controversial of these
programs is vested in the public schools, with the nonpublic
schools' participation severely limited, a study of federal programs and the aid they are providing could establish a basis
from which to draft legislative proposals for state aid.' 80
The Illinois legislature is not considering any new proposals

for state aid at the present time. This inactivity results from two
factors: first, the recent Klinger decision held the ambitious programs for state aid to nonpublic schools unconstitutional; second,
major interest groups for such aid have been awaiting a decision
from the United States Supreme Court on the constitutionality of
the Title I program and its benefits to nonpublic schools.'- That

decision could provide further definitive language from the Court
on the constitutionality of aid proposals. The emergence of a
standard test whereby establishment clause cases may be adjudicated indicates that perhaps some stability and predictability
will be found in this area of the law. The low income family
grant program, such as that held unconstitutional in Klinger,
and tuition reimbursement, tax credit, voucher, 1 2" or other pro19 For a discussion of the federal programs enacted in 1965 which benefit
nonpublic schools, see Rousseau, Church-State: A Legal Survey - 1966-68,
43 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 684 at 734-64 (1968) ; Elementary and Secondary
Education Act of 1965 and the First Amendment, 41 IND. L.J. 302 (1965) ;
Sky, The Establishment Clause, The Congress and the Schools; An Historical
Perspective, 52 VA. L. Rsv. 1395 (1966). The last article gives an excellent
perspective on the formulation of the establishment clause by tracing the
influence of Madison, and to a lesser extent Jefferson, on its formulation.
180 This article is limited in scope to a study of state aid to nonpublic
schools. Therefore, the discussion of federal aid provisions has been limited
to a brief survey of those programs benefiting elementary and secondary
nonpublic schools only as a basis for determining where and to what extent
state aid will be necessary to supplement the federal programs and to show
the areas in which federal funding is lacking.
181 Barrera v. Wheeler, 475 F.2d 1338 (8th Cir. 1973). This case is now
before the United States Supreme Court which has heard the arguments. The
decision will probably be rendered before June. The case is a class suit
brought by supporters of federal aid to nonpublic schools to enjoin Title I
funds from being arbitrarily denied to nonpublic school children in Missouri.
The Court of Appeals in the Eighth Circuit held for these plaintiffs. Of special interest to other states receiving funds under Title I are the issues of:
1) whether private schools should share in funding of this program on an
equitable basis of quality, scope, and opportunity; and 2) whether public personnel should be allowed to teach under this program on nonpublic school
premises.
182 Voucher plans were proposed before the Nyquist, Levitt, and Sloan
decisions in 1973. These plans would provide each parent with a voucher
to be used at any accredited school participating in the voucher system.
The schools, in turn, would present the accumulated vouchers to the state
education agency for reimbursement. The voucher plans were proposed to
avoid the third test of excessive entanglement. However, their substantive
impact would be to subsidize religion, and thus would fail the second test by
having a primary effect of advancing religion. See CENTER FOR THE
STUDY OF PUBLIC POLICY, Education Vouchers 1-6 (1970) ; Friedman,
Capitalism and Freedom 91-94 (1962); Education Vouchers: The Fruit of
the Lemon Tree, 24 STAN. L. REv. 687 (1972).
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grams which operate in such a manner that the substantive impact is a subsidy of religion, will continue to be invalid.
However, state aid which provides textbooks of a secular
nature to nonpublic schools may be enacted in Illinois and, if enacted, would help to ease the financial strain on these schools. The
earmarking of present funds, given to public school districts for
textbooks to be used by both public and nonpublic schools, would
meet with heavy opposition from local public school districts who
are already being pressed to meet their own financial needs.
However, a state legislative proposal providing for additional
funds to finance textbooks to all school children in the state would
satisfy both the finance requirement in Klinger and the political
opposition of the local public school districts. This proposal
would have to eliminate language couching this aid in terms of
the state's "duty" or "entitlement" of the student to such aid.
Shared-time proposals would also seem to be constitutional
under the recent decisions. Shared-time, or dual enrollment, is a
concept whereby a nonpublic school student receives a portion of
his education from a public school in that area under a mutual
8 3
A
agreement of the public and nonpublic school officials.1'
shared-time program has been carried out in Chicago between
a public and nonpublic school,"" and was held constitutional unHowever, a shared-time
der the 1870 Illinois Constitution. '
program would suffer from several limitations. First, it would
result in increased costs to the public school system, although it
might preclude the closing of a nonpublic school in a certain area
and stem the influx of those students into the public school system, thereby minimizing such increased costs. Second, it would
provide administrative and transportation difficulties for the participating schools and those nonpublic school students receiving
an education in the nonpublic and public schools. Finally, if
carried to the extreme, it would diffuse the nonpublic school's
effect on the individual student, and adversely affect his ability
to relate to one school.
Health services and remedial and therapeutic programs for
nonpublic school children could be enacted on the basis of similar federal programs in these areas, to supplement the funds now
being received by nonpublic schools from the federal programs.
Minor restrictions would guarantee that these funds were used
only for secular purposes. In the event that the remedial and
therapeutic program was not held to be sufficiently restricted, a
183 Shared-Time - Permissible Aid To Sectarian Education, 17 DEPAUL
L. REV. 373 (1968).
184 Id.
185 Morton v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Chicago, 69 I1. App. 2d 38, 216
N.E.2d 305 (1966).
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prominent severability clause in the legislation would insure the
maintenance of the health services. The financing of such services would again be maintained by the state for all school
children alike.
The board created to establish exemplary and innovative
programs in Klinger could be resurrected by the enactment of
distinct policies and restrictions to insure its secular nature,
using the federal Title III program as a guide. This legislation
would then have the vitality and sustained success of asimilar
federal program and its implementation to support its 'constitutionality.
The expenditure of state funds pursuant to a statute which
is later found unconstitutional does not render the state liable for
reimbursement of those funds. 186 Therefore, legislators should
not be concerned that "exploratory" legislation in this area would
render a harmful retroactive effect on the nonpublic schools it
was intended to assist. Speculative legislation in this area to
fulfill a portion of the nonpublic school student's needs may
therefore be a wise alternative to a resignation to the constitutional limitations the decisions have invoked.
In conclusion, Illinois may now move to pass legislation in
the area of aid to nonpublic schools on the basis of tests which,
because of United States and Illinois Supreme Court decisions
interpreting them, emerge more clear in definition and admit
more readily to anticipated construction. Certain vital forms
of aid, which include the major expenses of education, are almost strictly prohibited. These include any subsidies, or forms
of payment amounting to a subsidy of teachers' salaries, tuition,
building funds, or maintenance and repair funds. However,
certain aid programs relieving a smaller portion of operating expenses may be instituted and should find sanction in the rapidly
restricting "play in the joints" of the Constitution, referred to
7
in 1970.18
Keith M. Altenburg

1SOLemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192 (1973).
This decision was based
on a different issue from those presented in the 1971 Lemon decision.
187 397 U.S. at 669.

